Public opinion does not fall out of the sky. What passes for public opinion in the European Union is largely the answers of its citizens to questions posed in surveys commissioned and controlled by the European Commission. This paper presents the first systematic mapping of the topics and non-topics of the 400 so-called Special Eurobarometers: reports based on batteries of questions about specific policy issues posed in face-to-face interviews to about 25,000 citizens, constituting nationally representative samples of all member states. This exploration is especially relevant against the background of the increased politicisation of the EU; both given the potential value of public opinion as a "substitute" for a more direct link to the electorate and as a power resource in decision-making. We chart the frequency of Special EBs over time, identify the topics (and non-topics) using the Comparative Agenda Project's EU codebook, and relate their frequency to the distribution of competencies between the EU and its member states. We also document the variation across DGs in their effort to gauge public opinion. We conclude that the Commission is increasingly seeking public opinion and that it does so in a very broad range of policy areas. We find a curvilinear relationship between the degree of EU competencies and the frequency of Special EBs. Citizen input is less sought in areas where the EU already has far reaching competencies and in areas which are clearly in the national (or even sub-national) domain. The lion's share of Special EBs is conducted in the realm of shared competencies, with an emphasis on those areas where the EU got involved relatively recently. We also detected only two Special EBs specifically related to the redistribution of resources (e.g., cohesion policy) and none on immigration. We also find a large variation across the DGs on whose behalf Special EBs are conducted. Three DGs are responsible for half of all EBs and nine DGs for less than five percent. These results open up promising avenues for research on the responsiveness of the European Commission and its agenda setting strategies and legitimacy seeking behaviour.
Producing salience or keeping silence?
An exploration of topics and non-topics of

Special Eurobarometers
Introduction 'The concept of enhancing the link between Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) payments and environmental protection throughout the EU and limiting the amount of payments any individual farm can receive are broadly supported by EU citizens, according to a EUROBAROMETER opinion poll published today'…' EU Agriculture Commissioner Dacian Cioloș welcomed the poll'ʹs findings, stating today: 'I have always underlined that the CAP is not just for farmers, but for all EU citizens.
This poll confirms that some of the key concepts of our reform -such as "Greening"
and "ʺCapping"ʺ have wide public support. ' (European Commission, 2011) 
'It is important to remember that the Eurobarometer is an instrument created and financed by a political institution. It is therefore inconceivable that it could somehow
damage that institution with the publication of adverse results in this regard' (Signorelli 2012: 69) Public opinion does not fall out of the sky. In fact, what passes for public opinion in the European Union consists largely of the answers of European Union citizens to questions regularly posed to them in surveys commissioned and controlled by the European Commission. These surveys do not only enquire about general citizen attitudes towards the EU. In fact, around 400 times thousands of EU citizens have been surveyed through face-to-face interviews about specific policy topics ranging from nuclear waste disposal to sex tourism, from disaster management to breast cancer, from food safety to child care, and from corruption to public service liberalization. Questions may concern the citizens' problem perceptions, their behaviour, their awareness and evaluations of current EU policies, their preferred policy solutions and the level (national or EU) at which action should be taken.
Specific exemplars of these so-called Special Eurobarometers occasionally raise the interests of scholars working in in a particular policy area, but to our knowledge there has never been a systematic overall mapping of these massive investments in gauging citizen opinion (however, see Signorelli 2012 1 ). This lacuna is surprising for a number of reasons.
From a normative perspective the Special EBs can be viewed as a potentially important link between the Commission and citizens. This link may become more relevant in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, which marked the end of the permissive consensus: winning support for further integration at referenda cannot be taken for granted, Eurosceptic parties have been established and have increased in importance, and trust in the EU is declining in the member states (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2008) . As a response, European institutions, and in particular the European Commission, claim to seek wider societal input by reaching out towards civil society organizations and the public at large. After the Dutch and French 'no' on a European Constitution, the European Commission drafted an 'Action Plan to improve communicating Europe ' (2005) . 1 In the course of our research it came to our attention that a policy paper by the think tank Notre Europe contains information covering the same ground as the third part of our analysis: the number of Special EBs requested by each DG (Signorelli 2012) .
The action plan states that:
'Communication establishes a relationship and initiates a dialogue with European citizens, it listens carefully and it connects to people. It is not a neutral exercise
devoid of value; it is an essential part of the political process (European Commission, 2005: 3) .
According to the Commission, one of the most important elements of this 'listening process' is the analysis of Eurobarometer data (European Commission, 2005: 8) .
While some instruments to link citizens to the EU, such as internet and 'output' legitimacy regarding the evaluation of existing policies (Scharpf 1999 ). The first quote in the beginning of this paper illustrates the use of the results of a Special Eurobarometer for claiming this 'output' legitimacy.
Also and related to the former point, assuming that the Commission is at least partly an agent with own interests, the end of the permissive consensus might also have caused a shift in the strategy of the Commission to claim its importance. Majone and many other scholars have conceptualized the Commission as an institution that tries to expand its influence by expanding the legislative scope of EU policy (Cram, 1993; Majone, 1996; Wendon, 1998: 340; Pollack, 2003: 35; Wonka, 2008; 1146 , Hartlapp et al. 2014 . As Princen has argued "the European Commission and other supra-national actors had to demonstrate to a larger extent than the established national governments that 'their' level is the appropriate level to deal with the issue at hand. " (2011: 940) . Empirical research has demonstrated that the Commission used to follow a depoliticized route of agenda setting, through relatively close policy (expert) communities (Princen & Rhinard, 2006; 1121) . Against the background of the end of the permissive consensus, the results of the Special EBs may help to build credibility for new EU proposals. If a (large) majority of citizens in a (large) majority of countries declare that a topic should be tackled on the EU level, this should give the Commission a powerful resource to put the issue on the EU political agenda. At the same time, once an issue is dealt with on the EU agenda, the Commission may seek public support through public opinion research that helps her to argue in favour of goals, instruments and institutional forms that the Commission prefers. As the same questions are asked in all countries, the Commission might even claim to have tapped into the European public opinion. Hence the Commission may have an incentive to take citizen views into account as an important resource for their policy activities, in addition to expertise and support of organized interests (Haverland 2013) .
As the results of Special EBs are public, the Commission may want to avoid a situation where a majority of citizens in a majority of countries voice an opinion that is detrimental to the Commission's interests. As the Commission is in the driving seat with regards to which topics are to be addressed and which are not ("non-topics"), the Special Eurobarometer might not be the innocent instrument it appears at first glance.
These considerations raise a lot interesting research questions. The purpose of this paper has a rather modest explorative aim, however. We seek to answer the following questions:
First, against the background of the end of the permissive consensus, we wonder whether the European Commission increasingly seeks public opinion. In other words, we assess whether the number of Special EBs has increased over time.
Secondly, as the Commission is not obliged to seek public opinion but has to publish the results if it does so, we wonder on which topics the Commission surveys citizens and on which topics it does not. We will also relate the frequency of topics to the competencies of the EU as expressed in the Lisbon Treaty. This admittedly broad-brush approach helps to get a first insight into whether the Commission is more likely to invite public opinion in areas where they have comparatively more competencies.
Thirdly, we tap into differences within the Commission. The Commission is not a monolith. In fact, empirical research has demonstrated quite a measure of bureaucratic politics among its component parts: the Directorates General (DGs) (see e.g. Hartlapp et al. 2014) . Special EBs are requested by specific DGs within the Commission. Hence results of Special EBs might not only be used as a resource vis-à-vis other political actors but also as a resource in interdepartmental negotiations within the Commission. Therefore, we map the frequency by which a DG requests Special EBs. For instance, we assess whether a Special Eurobarometer concerning the single market actually requested by DG Internal Market and Services or for instance by DG Health and Consumer Protection.
To be sure, our aim is 'only' an exercise in mapping and exploration. We do not present evidence as to what is actually done with the results of the Special EBs. We wish to strongly emphasize, however, the simple but important fact that having public opinion on an issue is a precondition for "producing salience". Citizens' opinions cannot matter, at least not by means of the Special Eurobarometer, if they are not measured.
In the remainder of the paper, we will fist provide general information about the Eurobarometer surveys and their three main formats: Special EBs, Standard EBs and Flash EBs. In Section three, we will briefly review existing critical studies on the Eurobarometer. We will then elaborate on our design (Section 4). Sections five, six and seven will address our empirical results: the development in frequency of Special EBs over time, the topics addressed and neglected, and variations in the DGs who requested Special EBs. In the conclusion, we sketch research questions for future research. and 1971, the Commission decided in 1973 to start a bi-yearly poll to gauge 'European public opinion' on a regular basis (Signorelli, 2012; 13 (Signorelli, 2012; 17) . According to Signorelli, the Eurobarometer can therefore be seen as 'something of a trademark that can be used by the two institutions' (Signorelli, 2012; 17) .
The Standard Eurobarometer is made up of a set of questions that are posed repeatedly over time. These 'trend' questions concern general attitudes towards life and society, European integration and European institutions, and socio-demographic characteristics. There are also questions included, which tap into materialist and post-materialist values, reflecting the involvement of the eminent social scientist Ronald Inglehart in the early day of the Eurobarometer (GESIS, n.d.). The Standard Eurobarometer produces a wealth of cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Therefore, although mainly conducted for 'policy counselling reasons' (Saris & Kaase1997a: 4) , the Eurobarometer surveys are also hailed for their value for comparative social science research (Reif & Inglehart, 1991: xv) .
However, the large-scale surveys conducted under the label Eurobarometer do not only contain the above-mentioned categories of questions. In fact citizens are also surveyed about a great variety of specific policy topics.
Typically, batteries of questions regarding these specific topics are requested by various DGs of the European Commission, or sometimes other EU institutions, for in-depth thematic studies (about 100 pages long), the socalled Special Eurobarometer (Signorelli, 2012; 26) . These thematic studies are the focus of this paper. Europeans regarded Israel as the most important threat to international peace (Signorelli 2012: 69-70) . Signorelli also mentions the "membership is a good thing" questions. This trend question has been asked since the earlier 1970s but not after 2011, or at least for the current member states. A reason for this omission could be that the percentage of people who see EU membership as a 'good thing' has dropped below 50 per cent, with even lower results for some countries. Signorelli therefore concludes that " [t] he political interest behind the decision to not include a "Trend" question that reflects the difficult period that the EU is going through is obvious here" (2012; 66).
None of these studies, nor any other studies we are aware of, have however systematically explored the topics and non-topic of Special EBs. This study tries to fill part of this void by a first mapping and exploration of Special EBs.
Research design
The paper provides a systematic description and exploration of characteristics Project (Alexandrova et al. 2013) . The EU codebook is a slight adaptation of the US codebook. The US codebook distinguishes 22 policy areas ('main topics'), basically all areas of government activities conceivable. Although the EU codebook specifies certain codes to make it better workable in the EU context, it keeps the comprehensive scope of the original. No policy areas are excluded. The EU codebook is regularly updated and we use the most recent codebook available at the time of writing. All Special EB reports, save one, contain the name of the actor that has requested the Eurobarometer. In addition, 15 reports (4 per cent) are not available for download, thereby resulting in missing values for the actor requesting the Eurobarometer and in some cases for the topic as well (as the title was too ambiguous to infer the topic code).
Increase in the production of public opinion?
The first question we posed was whether the European Commission increasingly seeks public opinion through Special EBs. Looking at the population of Special EBs, we see indeed a dramatic increase over time.
Before the 1990s, hardly more than five Special EBs a year have been conducted. In the 1990s, the average was almost ten Special EBs a year, and in the 2000s the average further increased to about 15 (see Figure 1) .
From the 1980s on, each Commission has executed more Special EBs than its predecessors, with the exception of the short-lived Delors III Commission. 
Topics addressed and neglected
The previous section has demonstrated that the European Commission is increasingly commissioning Special EBs. It also shows that the European Parliament has become increasingly involved and that sometimes other actors request Special EBs. For the remainder of the paper, however, we want to focus on the European Commission which is responsible for 360 of the 392
Special EBs for which we were able to locate the requesting institution.
6 The start and end dates of each EC presidency were found on: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2004-2009/president/history/. Eight Special EBs which were commissioned by the European Parliament were missing on the EC website. They were retrieved from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00191b53ff/Eurobarometer.html This section addresses the question for which topics opinion is sought and for which topics not or in other words where the Commission 'produces salience' and where it 'keeps citizens silent'.
Figure 2: Topics addressed in Special EBs
Source : European Commission (1970 As stated before, the topics are coded according to the EU codebook of the Comparative Agenda Setting Project. This codebook is a slight adaptation of a coding scheme initially developed for national policy-making. As Figure 2 reveals, Special EBs are commissioned in almost all areas that are also the domain of national policy making (see also below). 7 We focused on the 360 Special EBs which are commissioned by the European Commission (in general or by a specific DG). However, forty Special EBs are too general to be meaningfully coded into one of the categories of the codebook, such as 'social climate'. This leaves us with 320 Special EBs.foo 8 The numbers between brackets are the absolute number of Special EBs per topic.
In comparing the relative importance of different policy areas it is difficult to establish a benchmark. Where would one expect more or less effort to gauge public opinion? A useful starting point to us seems the degree to which the EU has competencies in the respective policy area. We have mapped the relative share of different topics on the division of competencies as stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty that has been adopted in 2007 and enacted in 2009 (see Table 1 ). This allows us to gain a rough picture as to whether the relative share is related to the degree to which competencies are located at the EU level. As the Lisbon Treaty is the most recent EU treaty and as there is no policy area where the Lisbon Treaty stipulates less EU competencies than any prior treaty (see e.g. Bӧrzel 2005 , Hix 2005 , this amounts to conservative measurement for Special EB's conducted prior to the Lisbon Treaty: if a Special EB is conducted in a policy area in which according to the Lisbon Treaty the EU has no or minor competencies, the EU had not more competencies at the time the Special EB has actually been conducted.
Notwithstanding this, we will also report significant longitudinal variation in the appearance of topics.
In the Annex to this paper we explicate how the codebook's categories of main topics, and if necessary sub-topics, have been aligned with the categories of EU policy competencies (see Annex). EBs on health issues and the healthcare system. Note that these do not concern those health issues, where the EU has shared competencies (see below). Finally one might also wonder why the Commission has conducted four Special EBs on sport.
Moving up the 'ladder' again towards more integrated areas we arrive at the so-called specific arrangements. These arrangements basically denote decision-making by intergovernmental bargaining and coordination, rather than the Community method. There are two broad areas here (socio-) economic policy and common foreign and security policy.
In terms of economic coordination seven Special EBs have been conducted by the Commission, dealing with inter alia demographic issues, the European We can be briefer on the other main area of specific arrangements: common security and foreign policy. There are considerably less Special EB's here than concerning the previously discussed economic and social policy issues. We counted six Special EB's in total. Note that the Commission never conducted a Special EB on defence.
The lion's share of Special EBs is conducted in the areas of shared competencies. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of them concern the single market, the core project of EU integration. Twenty-one of them focus on various aspects of the internal market (about half of those related to services), taking mostly a consumer perspective. In addition, 14 Special EBs focus on consumer protection in a narrower sense.
There are also many surveys concerning Agriculture, one of the oldest EU policy areas. However, none of the 28 surveys dealt specifically with what might be regarded the core of the CAP, agricultural subsidies and the common organization of agricultural markets. Note, however, that some surveys include issues in these domains such as 'capping', but they are not a prominent part of these more general inquiries. In contrast to this, we counted seven Special EBs on food safety and seven on biotechnology, for instance.
This implies that citizen opinion is invited on the regulatory aspects of agriculture rather than its redistributive aspects.
That redistribution is rather a non-issue is further confirmed by the low number of Special EBs concerning cohesion policies. In terms of social cohesion, there has been one survey on the European Social Funds. Likewise, in terms of territorial cohesion only one Special EB explicitly touches upon EU wide inter-regional redistribution and that one is from 1980. In other words, for the last three decades, citizens were not asked about the largest redistributive programmes the EU is running, the EU Cohesion funds. Note also, that there has never been a Special Eurobarometer about the EU budget as such.
Analysing the other areas of shared competencies we can make a preliminary distinction between domains where the EU already has competencies for a long time and areas where the EU has only recently gained competencies. We find relatively less Special EBs in the ´old´ areas and they are relatively speaking from older vintage.
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This holds for the five surveys concerning
Social Policy as defined in the TFEU, that is health and safety at the work place and working conditions, the seven surveys on transport policy, and also for those on energy (14) the environment (22) and development aid (18).
We find more and relatively more recent activity concerning relatively new EU competencies. Twenty-eight surveys have been conducted in the area of public health including surveys on cancer, aids, drug abuse, smoking, alcohol, health risks related to the sun and to electric magnetic fields, and even mental health, oral health, blood donation and blood transfusions. 14 Two Special Eurobarometer on public health actually consist of a series of thematical studies (six and seven respectively, indicated by sub-numbers on the Commission's website). We did not count them on the sub-number level. Hence our measure is conservative in this respect.
with law and crime issues such as violence and white collar crimes like corruption. At the same time, there has not been a single Special EB (sic) that has focused on an immigration issue, such as refugees and asylum issues, the integration of immigrants, acquisition of nationality or border control.
Overall we find a roughly curvilinear pattern with relatively less Special EBs in areas where the EU already has far reaching competencies and in areas where policy issues are clearly (sub-) national. The lion's share of Special EBs is conducted in areas of shared competencies, and here we counted more Special EBs, and also on average on more recent vintage, in areas where the EU has gained competencies more recently.
7. Variation within the Commission in gauging public We found that DGs vary starkly in their effort to gauge public opinion (see European Commission (1970 In other words, especially those DGs tasked with economic and foreign affairs issues almost never invite the opinion of European citizens. This is consistent with the results of our previous section, where we have seen that there are indeed only very few Special EBs in the area of foreign and security policies and core areas of economic policies areas such as competition policy, external trade policy, taxation and the budget.
At the same time citizens have been frequently surveyed about some particular economic issues, in particular those related to the internal market.
But as stated above these surveys often either take a consumer perspective or explicitly deal with consumer protection. It is typically not DG Internal Market or DG Enterprise who request Special EBs related to the internal market broadly understood, but DG Health and Consumer Protection (see Figure 5 ). Source : European Commission (1970 The large number of Special EBs for DG Health and Consumer Protection is based on activities in both areas of its responsibility: health and consumer protection.
The large number of Special EBs on behalf of DG Employment and Social
Affairs is a result of the fact that this DG is responsible for almost all Special
EBs in the area of Social Policy and of Employment Policy. In addition, this
18 Note that this table is based on the relevant category of the agenda codebook. The codebook collapses a number of categories of EU policy competencies: internal market in a narrow sense, consumer protection, and tourism.
DG is also responsible for nine of the 18 Special EBs in the category of civil rights focusing on discrimination, of for instance women or disabled people.
In where the EU has gained competencies relatively late. Perhaps strikingly, however, as mentioned above, there has never been a Special EB on immigration.
In terms of policy characteristics, we see Special EBs in particular in the area of regulation (e.g. health regulation, consumer protection, social rights).
Although this fits the notion of the EU as regulatory state (e.g. Majone 1996) we find it worth mentioning that in redistributive areas in which the EU has competencies citizens are 'kept silent'.
We also see a large variation as to the DGs on whose behalf the Special EBs According to the codebook, the five Special EB's on EU citizen's perception of German reunification fall into 'Public Lands and Watermanagement' as they concern territorial issues. We excluded them here because we believe that they do not really deal with (sub-) national issues as understood here. As similar reasoning applies to two Special EB's on Europe of the Regions, In our view, they should neither be coded as part of "Housing and Urban Development" nor as "Cohesion Policy". We added five Special EB's about 'Sport'. These EB fall under the category 'Miscellaneous', a category this is as such excluded because the themes are too general (see Footnote 8), but we felt that these five EB's are specific enough to be included here. 
